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Crowdsourcing is a new value creation business model. Annual revenue of the Chinese market alone is
hundreds of millions of dollars, yet few studies have focused on the practices of the Chinese crowdsourcing
workforce, and those that do mainly focus on solo crowdworkers. We have extended our study of solo
crowdworker practices to include crowdfarms, a relatively new entry to the gig economy: small companies
that carry out crowdwork as a key part of their business. We report here on interviews of people who work in
53 crowdfarms. We describe how crowdfarms procure jobs, carry out macrotasks and microtasks, manage
their reputation, and employ different management practices to motivate crowdworkers and customers.
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1

INTRODUCTION

To frame our research, we align the term ’crowdsourcing’ with existing literature. Crowdsourcing
relates to individuals or organisations that put out an ‘open-call’ [24] for tasks that they want
completed. Interested workers can tender for these tasks and earn money by completing them
remotely. Solo crowdworkers make up most of this large, growing digital workforce. They usually
undertake crowdwork part-time, work from home, and take on self-contained tasks that require
few specialized skills [4, 32]. Solo crowdworkers using human intelligence to rival the effectiveness
of computational systems have been remarkably successful at data clustering, content labelling and
other relatively short and simple tasks [1, 40]. Crowdsourcing is regarded as a new value creation
model in China, invigorating China’s IT industries [70]. According to Huo, Zheng and Tu [55],
in 2017, 30 million Chinese crowdworkers served more than 190,000 enterprises and individuals,
generating a total business turnover of CNY five billion (approximately $700M). At the time of
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writing, ZBJ 1 and EPWK 2 , two of the most prominent crowdsourcing platforms in China, support
around 19 million active crowdworkers and cover a wide range of tasks, ranging from click-work
to product design and software development.
Some of the more complex tasks posted on crowdsourcing platforms, such as engineering
and software development, require higher levels of expertise or more diverse skills than solo
crowdworkers can provide [38]. In response, crowdsourcing platforms can promote crowdworkers
functioning as teams. This has recently appeared in the West. For example, in 2019 Upwork unveiled
a service called “Agency Experience,” 3 to support boutique agencies: small firms specializing in
larger, complex and high-value crowdtasks. Fiverr announced a service called "Studios" 4 that also
supports crowdworkers who join forces to tackle tasks marked by complexity, scale and scope.
However, organizational participation in and support for crowdsourcing arose earlier in China and
has been evolving, as we describe in this paper. ZBJ, for example, promotes itself as an “incubator”
of over 150,000 crowdsourcing companies and has provided direct support to these firms since 2016.
It offers work spaces and dedicated services, such as financial and legal services, to what they refer
to as “crowdsourcing factories” 5 in 26 major cities in China. These “factories” are organizations that
vie for tasks posted on the ZBJ platform and together create “united crowdsourcing communities.”
A few years ago, some of us applied methods from human-computer interaction (HCI) and
computer supported cooperative work (CSCW) to study solo crowdworkers and expanded our
focus to include this phenomenon when we encountered it. Our early study [67], which was also
one of the first empirical study of firms engaging in crowdwork, suggested that in contrast to
self-employed Chinese solo crowdworkers undertaking part-time microtasks from home [69], these
small organizations undertake complex and large macrotasks, employ salaried full-time workers,
and operate in formal workplaces such as business premises. We attributed their emergence to the
changing nature of tasks posted on the Chinese crowdsourcing platforms, together with favorable
government policies such as the "mass entrepreneurship and mass innovation program" and support
from platforms, such as the "ZBJ factories" noted above. To pointedly describe these companies, we
dubbed them "crowdfarms." Our use of “crowdfarm” employs the relevant English “farming work
out” (i.e., outsourcing) concept to identify this as a unique kind of firm, different from crowdsourcing
platforms or firms that post crowdsourcing jobs. Chinese IT workers sometimes self-mockingly
call themselves as “ma nong” (“code farmers” in English) to both describe the heavy pressures they
encounter in digital work and support their identity and camaraderie with those doing similar
jobs [60]. Given the mixed connotations of the term "ma nong" or "code farmer," we decided to use
the respectful "crowdfarm worker," not "crowdfarmer," to avoid any appearance of insensitivity
toward people whose work we value.
A subsequent study [68] found that solo crowdworkers and crowdfarm workers differ in terms
of their work environments, task-related problems, career development, rewards, reputation management, and work-life balance. It also found that crowdfarms differed from traditional small and
medium size businesses in that they moved from offline business to online crowdwork for the sole
purpose of capitalizing on crowdsourcing opportunities. Earnings from crowd tasks had sharply
increased in most crowdfarms we interviewed. Most workers believed that crowdwork would soon
become their primary source of income, rather than being secondary to off-line work.
Those studies revealed an interesting, emergent form of digital labor but did not provide a detailed
account of how crowdfarms carry out tasks. Experimental studies of ad hoc groups of crowdworkers
1 https://www.zbj.com

2 https://www.epwk.com/

3 https://www.upwork.com/blog/2019/07/new-agency-experience/

4 https://www.fiverr.com/stores/studios
5 https://work.zbj.com/
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recruited for tasks have shown that decision-making, collaboration and task operation can be
influenced by varying the organizational workflow [45, 64]. This paper examines the work practices
of crowdfarms to provide a deeper understanding of this new workforce in the wild. We conducted
53 interviews of workers from 53 crowdfarms affiliated with ZBJ, the largest Chinese crowdsourcing
platform. The interviews focused on identifying work-related organizational and task characteristics
and explored the workflows of task procurement, task execution, and reputation management.
The key contributions to the CSCW and HCI fields are:
(1) A detailed investigation that identifies work-related characteristics of a novel type of companybased crowd workforce. This could motivate further scholarly inspections of companies
participating in crowdsourcing and how they spread or evolve into other forms of work
organization across the gig economy more generally.
(2) An understanding that crowdwork practices in crowdfarms can have positive or negative
impacts on other crowdsourcing stakeholders: solo crowdworkers, task requestors, and
platform companies.
(3) High-level recommendations for crowdsourcing platforms, taking into account the needs and
operational and work-related characteristics of crowdfarms. These include: (1) increasing
the transparency of the bidding mechanism for macrotasks; (2) refining the task system to
enable requestors to decide whether or not to permit a crowdfarm to subcontract tasks; (3)
developing strategies to regulate and normalize the potential secondary market formed by task
subcontracting; and (4) establishing distinct rating systems for macrotasks and microtasks.
The paper is organised as follows: After reviewing relevant literature, we outline our methodological
and data analysis designs. We then present our findings, detailing how crowdfarming companies
are organized for crowdwork, and common types of tasks that they undertake. We identify work
practices along three axes: task procurement, task execution, and reputation management following
task completion. We conclude with a discussion of the findings, a reflection on study limitations,
and consideration of possible directions for future research.
2
2.1

BACKGROUND
Crowdsourcing and type of crowdwork

Since Jeff Howe coined the portmanteau “crowdsourcing” in 2006 [24], it has been employed to
describe tasks in different areas [44, 65]. Several studies showed that crowdsourcing can be a
powerful tool to solve problems in which human intelligence is more efficient or effective than
computer systems, such as for classifying pictures [1, 40]. With Wilogo and Crowdspring as
examples, Schenk and Guittard [51] showed that companies and individuals can use crowdsourcing
to attract creative and novel ways to market their products and contents. By posting tasks related to
specific issues such as public concerns, health symptoms and financial contribution, scholars have
also shown that crowdsourcing is applicable to governmental policy-making, medical experiments,
and the creation of initiatives and enterprises [6, 53, 61].
Crowdsourced tasks can be categorized as microtasks or macrotasks. Microtasks are short, simple
tasks that can be completed reasonably quickly by an individual without relying on others [12, 18].
Examples are data collection and analysis [41], labeling or classifying images or other content [26,
50], spelling and grammar checking for short paragraphs [71], and captioning audio in real-time
for accessibility [33]. Macrotasks are larger and more complex. They may require or benefit from
collaboration among crowdworkers and often involve a range of skills. [32, 38]. Examples of
macrotasks are software development [47], product design [52] and document writing [63].
3
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2.2

Work practice of crowdworkers

The marked diversity of crowdsourcing and crowd tasks have prompted scholarly interest in
the work characteristics of crowdworkers. Several studies have illustrated that crowdworkers
mainly undertake microtasks that are decomposable, self-contained, small, and simple enough to
be performed repeatedly [14, 25]. As noted above, these tasks can include surveys, content (e.g.
image) labelling and transcription [27, 59]. Research into the work environment of crowdworkers
found that across various platforms (e.g. Amazon Mechanical Turk, CrowdFlower) they prefer
working from home, enjoying the flexibility (e.g. taking care of children while crowdworking) and
work efficiency facilitated by their home environment [5, 12]. In the context of task rewards, both
financial compensation (e.g. payment for tasks) and non-financial compensation (e.g. acquired
knowledge, skills and expertise) are important to crowdworkers. Ross et al [48] reported that
over 90% of the crowdworkers on Amazon Mechanical Turk posit that the significance of their
earning involves the ability to support their hobbies or make their basic ends meet. With respect
to non-financial rewards, Jiang, Wanger and Nardi [29] suggest that crowdworkers learn about a
rapidly changing world through their exposure to diverse information obtained in crowd tasks, and
can experience emotional fulfillment by helping others complete their assignments. To this end ,
the acquired skills and knowledge from crowd work in Margaryan’s study [39] helped workers
improve their task performance nd enhance their career potential.
Several studies have investigated how crowdworkers procure tasks. According to Law and von
Ahn [35], it mainly involves two central modes: (1) pull and (2) push. In the pull mode (e.g., Amazon
Mechanical Turk), crowdworkers select tasks themselves based on personal preferences, such as the
payment for tasks [9], the duration and complexity of tasks [43], and the conciseness of the instruction and requirements of tasks [49]. Finding crowdworkers who are driven by personal development
and tend to choose jobs that improve their expertise, Kaufmann, Schulze and Veit [31] propose
that these motivations can affect which crowd tasks are selected. In contrast, crowdworkers in the
push mode (e.g. Clixsense and Zooniverse [8, 28]) are allocated and assigned tasks based on a series
of constraints regulated by requestors. These constraints includes the level of skill required [23],
performance on previous tasks [30], the maximum number of attempts for the task [28], and, in
some mobile crowdsourcing scenarios, the time available, as well as the geographical location [57].
The push-oriented mode is popular for task procurement of both paid and voluntary crowdworkers.
Crowdsourcing studies have also focused on how crowdworkers process tasks. Early research
on the topic found that crowdworkers often undertake tasks independently [3, 24], but Gary et
al. [20] demonstrated that the crowd is also a collaborative network in which crowdworkers (1)
share administrative overheads with each other to reduce costs of managing the work process, (2)
exchange information about tasks and requestors to increase the opportunities of crowdwork, and
(3) help others complete tasks and advance them through teaching task-related skills, which can
include time management, search queries and executing basic scripts. Morries et al [42] suggest
that crowdworkers could better cooperate by subcontracting work sand thereby develop new skills,
such as task management and design, while other workers, especially novice and casual workers,
could benefit from the lower barriers of smaller and simpler subcontracted tasks. Having identified
10 cooperative ways crowdworkers handle tasks, D’Eon et al. [13] contend that workers are now
better at solving creative writing tasks, cognitive tasks marked by their difficulty, tasks with unclear
or subjective guidelines, and tasks requiring further division.
A third significant crowdwork practice is reputation management. In a study examining the
reputation of Indian Amazon Mechanical Turk workers, for instance, Gupta et al [21] illustrate
that the work of reputation management falls on the shoulders of crowdworkers wherever the
challenge to their reputation lies. To protect reputation, these crowdworkers tend to take defensive
4
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and preparatory tactics such as ensuring that they are capable of doing the tasks before accepting
them, getting training for tasks, and specialising in certain types of tasks for familiar requestors.
Similar strategies were also observed among the Eight crowdworkers [22]. Many workers would
return in-progress tasks if the complexity exceeded their current ability and might, therefore, risk
submitting low-quality work that could negatively impact their reputation [22].
2.3

Crowdsourcing in China

The literature cited above provides a thematic schema to examine crowdworkers and their work
practices. Only a few researchers have addressed crowdsourcing in China. Huo and Zhao [54]
conducted a study with 269 Chinese crowdworkers and found that 59% of the participants were
independent crowdworkers between 20 and 25 years old. They are also in general well-educated,
given that approximately 85% had bachelors degrees or above, 14% graduated from high school or
vocational school; only less than 1% were junior high school graduates or lower. In our study [69],
87% of the crowdworkers on the ZBJ platform did crowdwork part-time, with income and acquired
knowledge or skills the most important rewards. Feng and Huang [16] reported that Chinese
crowdworkers also consider personal interests and the opportunity of self-development in choosing
tasks. Yang et al. [72] reported some Chinese crowdworkers compete for tasks that have less
participants, to increase the opportunity of winning bids, as well as tasks likely to yield larger
rewards. In a similar vein, Shi [56] proposes that many Chinese crowdworkers seek easier, wellpaying tasks with longer task duration, while workers with higher reputations often take on
challenging tasks that can reap more lucrative rewards.
These studies provide insight into crowdsourcing in China, but not to crowdfarms, where our
earlier work found that work experiences differ markedly from those of solo crowdworkers in
attitudes towards tasks, rewards and reputation. [67] [68] This study was undertaken to obtain
insight into how these companies engage in crowdwork, focusing on crowdfarm workers and
managers who contract tasks on the largest Chinese crowdsourcing platform, ZBJ. We examined
their organizational characteristics, task characteristics, task procurement, how they carried out
tasks, and how they managed their reputation.
3

METHODOLOGY

We conducted a series of semi-structured telephone interviews with Chinese crowdfarm workers
and managers who work in the largest Chinese crowdsourcing platform, ZBJ. To do so, we first
posted a request for interviews as a task on ZBJ. After investigating the crowdworker payment
for the similar type of tasks, an above-average payment of 120 CNY (approx. US$17 USD) was
offered per interview. Unsure of the exact population of active crowdfarms, we decided to utilize the
straightforward opportunistic sampling method to obtain timely and initial primary data. However,
to balance the practicality and the representativeness of our sample, we clearly stated that our
study was targeted at crowdfarm workers in companies in which crowd tasks are taken as part of
the formal business. We also conducted an initial online discussion asking work-related questions
about the types of crowd tasks their companies usually do, their roles, and what they usually do
in their role. This was to avoid potential biases such as most crowdfarms being from the same
industry or most participants doing similar tasks. As ethical considerations we specified that each
interview was expected to take at least 30 minutes to complete, all data collected in the study would
be anonymous and confidential, and the participants were welcome to contact researchers with
any concerns.
In total, 53 individuals from 53 crowdfarms were recruited. They comprised 29 crowdfarm
workers and 24 crowdfarm managers. Crowdfarm worker in this context refers to an individual
who solely undertook tasks, while the managers included nine who manage “projects” or run
5
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the crowdfarm at a high level and 15 team leaders who partly engage in managerial work (e.g.,
allocating tasks to team members) while also engaging in detailed crowdwork. They were on
average 30 years old - 41/53 were either in their late 20s or early to mid-30s, while a handful (12/53)
were over 40. The majority were well-educated: 49 participants had graduated from vocational
schools or higher education institutions; four had high school or pre-high school education. All
earned at least 5000 CNY (approx. US$714 USD) every month and 28 of the 53 earned over 10000
CNY monthly (approx. US$1449 USD). This is well above the national average monthly income in
China (approximately US$340 in 2018).
The 53 crowdfarms in our study are private companies that undertake crowdwork specialized in
certain business areas: 23 specialize in IT-related tasks such as software development; 16 mainly
undertake logo or industrial design tasks and the other 14 are media companies providing advertising
and business planning services. Most (42/53) tend to hire experienced full-time workers based
on their primary work focus (e.g., IT crowdfarms hire more developers) while the others (11/53)
also recruit novices, such as graduates. Most (44/53) chose to work in business premises with
infrastructures such as a lobby, multimedia rooms and a stable Internet connection; the other nine
operated from residential apartment buildings where employees can also live (See Figure 1 for a
typical work environment of a crowdfarm worker). Most of the crowdfarms are small: 28/53 have
fewer than 10 employees, 19 have between 10 and 20, and only six employed more than 20 workers.
All interviews were conducted in Chinese. Most lasted between 35 minutes and 50 minutes with
four around 30 minutes and seven more than an hour. Consistent with previous crowdwork studies
covered in the Background section, our interviews revolved around the following themes: (1) how
crowdfarms organize for crowdwork; (2) the characteristics of the macrotasks and microtasks that
they usually do; (3) details in task procurement; (4) the execution of procured tasks, including both
internal collaboration and task subcontracting; (5) reputation management strategies, including
post-task maintenance and active efforts to publicize and advertise. During the interviews, we
utilized objective data (e.g., number of workers in crowdfarm) and subjective data (e.g., opinions
from crowdfarm workers) as ad-hoc probes to evoke important activities and practices and to
clarify ambiguous answers to obtain deeper understanding of a particular situation, such as task
subcontracting.
Data analysis went through the following stages: (1) familiarization with the data, (2) the development of a thematic framework, and (3) coding of the data. During the familiarization phase, all
interview data were translated from Chinese to English and transcribed by two Chinese researchers.
To ensure the quality of the transcript, an external language expert was also involved to confirm the
accuracy of the translation. We then started to create an initial thematic framework based on the
translated transcript, focusing on (1) crowdwork practices as detailed in the related literature and
(2) topics that surfaced during the familiarization phase. Then, the data were coded independently
by three researchers including the two Chinese researchers and an English-speaking co-author
who is specialized in crowdsourcing. During this stage, we used exact quotes from participants to
inductively identify potential themes and emerging patterns within the data, before collating all
the relevant coded data extracts within established themes, drawing on our preliminary framework
as a suitable schema. We then examined the inter-coder agreement, first calculating the Cohen’s 𝜅
index and then the 𝜅 coefficient across coder pairs using average P(e) values. Cohen’s 𝜅 (m)=0.766
(95% confidence intervals 0.100 to 0.212)) and p<0.0005. This result indicates a good strength of
agreement and that the coding is reliable and non-random.
Once the coding phase was completed, we continued to refine our initial thematic framework by
discussing the individual construct in a team meeting to resolve issues such as clarifying the broad
definition with low IRR, collectively reviewing the coded data extracts, and revisiting the data-set
in its entirety. This enabled us to iron-out any disagreements that arose during the analysis, to
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Fig. 1. An example of a typical work environment of a crowdfarm. The image was provided by one of the
participants during the interviews. They have consented for the photo to be published.

ascertain whether the themes "worked" in relation to the dataset, and to identify additional themes
beyond our existing schema. When we were confident that we had a coherent account based on a
proper thematic framework fitting our data-set, we had completed the analysis process.
4
4.1

FINDINGS
Organizational characteristics

The overwhelming majority of the crowdfarms in our study (51/53) are well-organized, with hierarchic working structure in their crowdwork. Crowdfarm workers undertake tasks in teams divided
by expertise, team leaders manage these specialized teams and also take on detailed crowdwork,
and managers are in charge of the overall crowdwork process including task procurement, carrying
out tasks, and reputation management. However, the crowdfarms in our study are not typically
managed autocratically. Many (47/53) combined top-down and bottom-up approaches, with crowdfarm workers engaging in the decision-making process at different stages, such as crowdwork
selection and decomposition. For the most part, this finding echoes previous crowdsourcing studies, which largely suggest that crowdsourcing processes blend the hierarchical management of a
problem-solving domain and the bottom-up solution process of crowdworkers (e.g. [7]). P1 illustrate
crowdfarm composition and practice:
“We conduct our work in a rented office on a business premise. [...] Our company has 10
full-time employees in total. Based on their skills, I divided them into 2 specialized teams a sales team that is mainly responsible for the connection with requestors and a technical
team that mainly carry out the detailed tasks. Each team has one leader. As the boss, my
main job is to coordinate and supervise all their works. [...] Sometimes, the employees
would also participate in different decision processes, such as selecting crowd tasks that
they prefer to do.” (P1, 33 years old, male, design crowdfarm)
Crowdfarms organization may be inherited from past practices: we found that all 53 crowdfarms
did offline business before they engaged in online crowdwork. This indicates that traditional
organizational approaches can be adapted in the crowdsourcing context. However, in contrast with
our earlier study [68] that found many crowdfarms relying primarily on offline work for revenue,
most of the 53 in this study have moved or are moving away from the traditional business context
to crowdsourcing. Specifically, for 11, crowdwork yields only about 20% to 30% of their revenue;
for 25, crowdwork earnings represent nearly half of their total revenue (e.g., 40%); and 17 now
7
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rely on crowdwork for over half of their income. The majority (45/53) indicated that the primary
motivation is monetary: crowdwork enables them to diversify their income streams and reach
a broader range of customers who may subsequently bring business directly to them. Many are
also motivated by finding projects matched to their particular skills and expertise (33/53). In this
respect, the diversity of crowdwork enables them to select tasks much as typical solo crowdworkers
do, motivated by a combination of intrinsic factors (e.g., skill variety) and extrinsic factors (e.g.,
immediate payoff) [31]. This is reflected in the following participant comment:
“We used to rely on offline business but we are now changing our business focus to
crowdwork that now accounts for around 40% of our total income. [...] One of the reasons
is that the online tasks are more diverse so that we can find the job that can best use our
expertise. For example, the customers who come to our physical store usually need some
simple work on fixing contaminated photos or contracts, while we took a large project
from a requestor who needed hundreds of sophisticated brochures for his company’s
annual meeting, which really require some craftsmanship.” (P2, 30 years old, male, media
crowdfarm)
4.2

Task characteristics

All 53 of the crowdfarms chiefly do macrotasks. Typical macrotasks are full-featured website/application
development, product design, and business activity planning. In contrast with microtasks, requestors
who post macrotasks on the ZBJ platform seek an all-round solution to a large task rather than
multiple submissions for different work units. Thus, macrotasks usually involve significant work
with complex requirements, on which crowdfarm workers operate collaboratively as a team for
a number of weeks. ZBJ designed a specific bidding mechanism for macrotasks. The number of
bidders (i.e., crowdworkers/crowdfarms) is limited to eight to avoid excessive competition for one
job. To improve the efficiency of the bidding process, interested parties can post on the task page
prior to submitting any completed work and then communicate with requestors about potential
solutions via phone calls, starting the work only when formally selected. Payments for macrotasks
are often substantial, so ZBJ may require requestors and selected crowdfarm/crowdworkers to sign
a legal contract to protect both parties. When we asked our participants why they predominantly
undertake macrotasks, the reason resoundly was that they pay better than microtasks. Many (32/53)
also noted that macrotasks enable them to more fully utilize their company’s expertise. P3 illustrated
the importance of macrotasks to their crowdfarms:
“Our company prefers to do macrotasks. On the one hand, this type of task usually pays
more. For example, it took us two weeks to complete a task worth 50,000 CNY, which
was to develop a management software for an enterprise. On the other hand, this kind of
large-scale task usually requires the participation of all employees of the company, so that
we can make full use of everyone’s strengths and everyone can earn their share.” (P3, 23
years old, male, IT crowdfarm)
The crowdfarms in our study also bid for some microtasks. These include human intelligence tasks,
such as data clustering as well as more creative tasks such as production of a logo/webpage/slogan.
Requestors tend to seek multiple submissions for these tasks, yet offer lower payments as the
work is less complex and can usually be handled by a single crowdworker or crowdfarm worker
in minutes to hours. The bidding mechanism of microtasks on the ZBJ platform is similar to that
on other crowdsourcing platforms, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants (crowdworkers/crowdfarms) directly submit the exact required solutions to bid with others while there are no
restrictions on the number of bidders and no contract involved in the process. When we asked why
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a crowdfarm also took on microtasks, most participants (47/53) described it as vital supplementary
income to fill the profit vacuum between macrotasks. Interestingly, some (18/53) also mentioned
that they take small tasks to train new employees — both in understanding the crowdworking
model and the context in which they operate and to cultivate task-related skills of new employees
so that they can further participate in crowdfarm work. These crowdfarm practices parallel those
of solo crowdworkers who take on tasks to build reputation [21] and capabilities [39] for better
engagement in future tasks. P4 shared the following about microtasks:
“Our company sometimes takes small tasks like logo/icon design and assigns them to the
new employees. It would be best if they won the bid and got accepted by requestors, but
the main purpose of doing this is to familiarize them with the workflow and to develop
their skills so that they can participate more quickly in the larger projects we have.” (P4,
35 years old, female, design company)
4.3 Task procurement
4.3.1 Macrotasks. Not surprisingly we found that crowdfarm management leads in selecting
macrotasks. In 39 companies decisions were made solely by managers, in 14 by managers and team
leaders. This is consistent with our previous finding crowdfarm workers usually undertake large and
complex tasks assigned by managers [68]. Although seven participants said that crowdfarm workers
should also be involved in the selection of macrotasks, the others felt that management should
select macrotasks. Their reasoning was that management better understand the work arrangement
and the expertise possessed by each team/worker and can thus better assess specialized tasks
requiring collaborations, and that confining the discussion to management would accelerate the
decision-making process and procure macrotasks more efficiently.
When we inquired about the factors affecting macrotask selection, both the crowdfarm workers
(29/53) and managers (24/53) in our study mentioned that their companies prefer to choose those
with higher remuneration. Another factor is task feasibility: is the task in a field they specialize
in and do they possess the ability to complete the task on time. Five participants mentioned that
the preciseness of requirements is also important; ill-defined requirements are less likely to be
selected. Precise requirements allow workers to focus energy on the task rather than deciphering
the requisites and increases the likelihood that their deliverables will be accepted. This finding
extends research that indicates that ambiguous task instructions negatively affect the performance
of crowdworkers [19] to outcomes for large and complex crowd tasks. P5 described how he selects
macrotasks for his crowdfarms:
“First of all, I will consider whether the task price is reasonable. If the payment of the task
is lower than the labor cost of my employees, then I will not do it. Secondly, I will see if we
have the ability to complete this task in case we fail and get bad ratings. Another factor is
that the requirements of the task must be clear. If the requestors themselves do not even
know what they need, then we have to spend a lot of extra energy on communicating with
him instead of working on the tasks.” (P5, 34 years old, male, media crowdfarm)
After a desirable macrotask is identified, a crowdfarm communicates with the requestor. All
crowdfarms in our study followed the bidding mechanism designed by ZBJ platform (see section
4.2), posting a reply on the task page expressing their interest in doing said task. To strengthen their
position against other competitors, the crowdfarms often highlight their reviews and utilize pictures
to showcase macrotasks that they had completed for other requestors (Figure 2). To increase the
likelihood of being selected, almost all crowdfarms in our study (47/53) also actively call requestors,
9

Yihong Wang, Konstantinos Papangelis, Michael Saker, Ioanna Lykourentzou, Vassilis-Javed Khan, Alan Chamberlain,
CHI’21, May 08–13, 2021, Yokohama, Japan
Yong Yue, and Jonathan Grudin

Fig. 2. An example of a typical post of a crowdfarm on a task page.

paying an additional charge (usually a few dozen CNY, a few US dollars) to get the phone number.
In these communications, managers further clarify the task requirements and propose a rough
solution for requestors to consider. In many cases (22/53), these discussions could extend over
several days because requestors are reluctant to discuss task requirements in detail with every
bidder before selecting one, and because some requestors lack task-related knowledge to accurately
describe the requirements, which means crowdfarms must spend extra effort to help them figure
out their needs based on their professional experience. This finding is not surprising given that
strenuous communication is a major problem crowdfarm workers report with crowdwork [68].
Once crowdfarms and requestors confirm their respective intention to cooperate, and as required
by the ZBJ platform, they sign a legal contract.The contract formalizes the working details of the
task (objectives, duration and remuneration) and agreements regarding the management of the
intellectual property (IP). This includes the acquisition of rights, such as assigning the ownership of
the submitted work to requestors, and limitation of liabilities, such as crowdfarms confirming that
their work does not infringe upon any third parties’ intellectual property). As reported by de Beer
et al., [11], contractual intellectual property management is important protection in crowdwork to
protect both parties from IP-related risks. After a requestor deposits part of the total task payment
(usually 20%-30%) on the platform as a trusteeship, crowdfarms start to carry out the macrotask.
P6, a manager from an IT crowdfarm, shared the contract signing process:
“The contract generally includes the payment of the task, deadline and the ownership of
the work and so on. Sometimes requestors would ask us to apply for a domain name for
the website. At this time, the contract will further involve terms like the domain names
must be registered with the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. So
we have to ensure that the domain name would not infringe on the intellectual property of
other companies. [...] These contracts are not only to avoid a legal dispute between us and
the requestors, but also to avoid a potential dispute between us and other third-parties.”
(P6, female, 34 years old, IT crowdfarm)
4.3.2 Microtasks. In contrast with macrotasks, the procurement of microtasks is straightforward
and similar to other crowdsourcing platforms that employ a competition mechanism. Crowdfarms
select a microtask, complete it, and submit it to the requestor who evaluates all submissions and
selects winners. In contrast to macrotasks, microtask selection is generally open to crowdfarm
workers, with 47 companies reporting direct employee involvement, either through staff meetings
(37/53) or by allowing workers to choose autonomously from crowdsourcing platforms (10/53),
reporting to management for the record. The ability to choose tasks that chime with their interests
10

An Examination of the Work Practices of Crowdfarms

CHI’21, May 08–13, 2021, Yokohama, Japan

has a positive effect on crowdfarm worker enthusiasm. P7 explained the value of involving workers
in microtask selection:
“When choosing microtasks, our company usually consults with employees to see what
kind of tasks we like. We do so via staff meetings or simply via group chat on Wechat. [...]
I think doing the tasks that I am interested in is a kind of adjustment to my daily work as
sometimes I will be bored by the repetitive work assigned by the management.” (P7, 25
years old, male, IT crowdfarms)
Our participants also noted payment and required skills/expertise considerations, as they did with
macrotasks. However, the evaluation process differed. Most (37/53) sought microtasks with better
payment, tempered by consideration of task duration, as participants needed to be available for the
next macrotask procured by their company. Nearly one-third of our participants (16/53) indicated
that “out-of-reach” skills/expertise is not necessarily a restriction. On the contrary, participants try
challenging microtasks in order to practice their skills, despite a higher risk of their work being
rejected. This finding is congruent with our observation that crowdfarms utilize microtasks to train
employees, and solo crowdworkers learn from failed attempts and errors [15, 39]. P8 detailed the
use of microtasks to train workers:
“Our company is ok with employees doing challenging tasks. We regard it as a good way
to practice their skills and expertise. However, if they fail, they have to learn from the
winning bids and explain to us [the management] the reasons why his/her work is not
selected and how s/he would improve in the future.” (P8, 45 years old, female, design
crowdfarm)

4.4

Carrying out tasks

4.4.1 Macrotasks. We found that some crowdfarms handle macrotasks entirely internally and
others may subcontract part of the work.
Working/doing tasks internally
After procuring a macrotask, the next step is to carry it out collaboratively. A majority (29/53) start
this process by formulating a work plan, with managers and team leaders decomposing the tasks
into smaller work units with clear timelines before assigning them to crowdfarm workers based on
their expertise. Almost half (24/53) conduct this hierarchically: managers assign the decomposed
tasks to team leaders based on team expertise, after which team leaders allocate the work units to
team members based on their personal skills. However, not all task decomposition and allocation
is fully controlled by management. Nearly three-fifths of our participants (32/53) mentioned that
the opinions of crowdfarm workers are taken into consideration as their understanding of the
processes and cycles of specific work units helps management formulate a better plan. Previous
crowdsourcing studies also indicated that deliberation could help crowdworkers converge on
decisions, and a collaborative environment can assist in decomposing complex crowdsourcing
tasks [10, 34]. P9 described this:
“In 60% of the cases, I will formulate the work plan with team leaders who will then assign
the work units they received to their team members. [...] They know better about these
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staffs’ expertise and detailed work arrangement than I do. [...] However, we will also seek
help from our experienced employees in the task planning as they have probably done
similar tasks before.” (P9, 30 years old, male, media crowdfarm)
Every crowdfarm in our study proactively monitors the quality of completed work units throughout the process. This is again the responsibility of management. Most (39/53) require crowdfarm
workers to report work progress via meetings or instant messages (e.g., Wechat). Team leaders and
managers provide feedback based on the reports, and occasionally help workers address problems
in person. Depending on task duration, reports could be made every few days or every week.
The other 14 crowdfarms supervise their work through software such as Alibaba Ding Talk and
Tencent TIM. According to the participants, computation-supported management enables daily
supervision and manager feedback, significantly increasing the efficiency of crowdfarm work.
Interestingly, four of the 14 crowdfarms developed their own management software, saving the
cost of a third-party system and resulting in the customized design of functions tailored to their
crowdwork practices. One company developed a sophisticated document system to manage the
work units uploaded from various teams and workers. Consistent with Valentine et al. [64], we
found that a computation-supported system can improve macrotask processing. Only one in four of
our crowdfarms followed this approach; the others relied on general-purpose third-party software.
This suggests an opportunity for crowdsourcing platforms to design cooperative work systems that
support work practices of both crowdworkers and crowdfarms. P10 described how his crowdfarm
uses "home-made" office software to manage work:
“It had been very inconvenient to check the design uploaded by workers doing different tasks,
so we developed software to help manage the work report. It allows us to track the progress
of different tasks systematically with clear timelines and I can also provide feedback as
soon as a new design is uploaded.” (P10, 30 years old, male, design crowdfarms)
In addition to supervising work, management in most crowdfarms (48/53) actively communicates
with requestors via social media such as Tencent QQ and Wechat to update task milestones. They
could share a demonstration video that shows the prototype of the user interface or a rough
picture of the product in design. For some crowdfarms (16/53), updating requestors is a way to
protect their interests. The phased work units sent to the requestors are evidence that a crowdfarm
has completed at least part of the task; they could be submitted to ZBJ for arbitration should a
contract dispute arise. However, a more common and important reason for keeping requestors in
the loop is to obtain timely feedback while further clarifying the requirements for subsequent work.
Based on feedback and clarification from requestors, management conducts staff meetings to plan
how to refine the completed work and, if necessary, adjust their work schedule to meet clarified
requirements of subsequent work units. Improvement based on communication with requestors
can continue up to the completion of all work units. The teams then work together to integrate
the parts into a final deliverable under the lead of management. They then upload this on the ZBJ
platform as the final submission to the requestor. Previous studies suggested that crowdworkers
have limited interactions with requestors until receiving notification of their work being accepted
or rejected [12, 21]. We found that crowdfarms involved in macrotasks communicate more with
requestors and thus have greater opportunity to improve their product before the final submission.
P11 illustrated this:
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“Every time a function of the software is completed, I will shoot a short video and send it
to the requestors via Wechat. If they are ok with it, I will double check the requirements of
the following work units with them. [...] It is not very often that they are dissatisfied with
our work, but if they are, I will contact the team responsible for this function or module to
have a meeting and discuss how to refine it. [...] There was a company that refused to pay
for the work we have done for them, so I uploaded these evidences, including the source
code, to ZBJ and won our money back.” (P11, 33 years old, female, IT crowdfarm)
Subcontracting parts of macrotasks
Over half of the crowdfarms (31/53) report sometimes subcontracting part of a procured macrotask
to external contractors. Crowdfarms subcontract when a work unit in a procured task requires
specialized techniques or expertise beyond their capability, such as a copywriting task that requires
both Chinese and English versions, or when requestors are repeatedly dissatisfied with certain work
units. When we asked to whom work units are subcontracted, 14 crowdfarms reported that they
usually relay them to local business partners believed to possess the necessary skills. The manager
of the crowdfarm explains the requirements to the partner and negotiates the price. Once a partner
completes their part of the job, the crowdfarm pays them and integrates all work units before
submitting to the requestor. Collaboration with other companies is a common strategy for small
Chinese enterprises with insufficient labor to carry out their businesses [37]. That said, 17 of the
crowdfarms, rather than relying on local business partners, usually re-crowdsource the work units
back to the ZBJ platform to seek solutions from random crowdworkers or crowdfarms. Throughout
the process, these crowdfarms act like a typical requestor, posting tasks with a lower payment,
usually 70-80% of what they charge the requestor. We were surprised to find that the practice of
re-crowdsourcing in four crowdfarms help them establish a stable group of solo crowdworkers.
Although not formal employees working on core work units, these workers could be consistently
involved in processing subordinate units of macrotasks; for example, designing web pages in a
full-featured website development task. Again, crowdfarms usually pay these solo crowdworkers
70%-80% of what they charge. Although we have identified some negative effects of crowdfarm
subcontracting practices [67], this indicates that while the subcontractors are paid less, some receive
a flow of tasks matched to their skills and exposure to macrotask work experiences that could
support career development. P12 explained why her crowdfarm subcontracts part of the procured
crowdwork:
“If a requestor keeps being dissatisfied with a certain part of the copywriting we have
done, then we have to subcontract this part of the work. In my opinion, this is also
responsible for the overall project and the employer. [...] We usually post tasks on ZBJ or
other crowdsourcing platforms and then pay for the best work.” (P12, 35 years old, female,
design crowdfarm)
We asked participants how they control the quality of subcontracted work units. Echoing the
process of internal collaboration, almost all of those that subcontract (29/31) receive regular work
progress reports from secondary workers, which they send to requestors for feedback. Some
crowdfarms (8/31) supervise more actively by assigning the employees responsible for the units to
work directly with the external contractors. For the most part, this is to avoid misunderstanding by
external partners or crowdworkers of the needs and intentions of requestors. Crowdfarms send
someone with first-hand information to guide the process of the shifted work as a consultant. If
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the secondary workers do not complete the shifted work as expected, crowdfarms either improve
the quality of the work on their own or find a new contractor to handle it. Interestingly, in contrast
with the typical crowdsourcing practice where unsatisfactory submissions are unlikely to receive
any payment, a few participants (4/31) mentioned that their companies pay secondary workers
at least part of the agreed remuneration as long as they complete the subcontracted task. The
principal reason is that a “thank you” reward to secondary workers helps maintain a collaborative
relationship. We previously described the significance to crowdfarms of actively maintaining
“guanxi” – interpersonal relationships involving obligation, commitment, and exchange of favors –
with requestors to gain future crowdwork opportunities [68]. This finding extends the understanding
of crowdfarms’ work practice by revealing that some also establish collaborative relationships with
secondary workers to support their crowdwork.
Finally, 31 crowdfarms exhibited mixed feelings about transparency of subcontracting practices
Fourteen reported actively informing requestors or even asking for permission when subcontracting
work units. They felt that requestors have the right to know how their tasks are being handled
and could object to their work being shifted to an unknown third party. However, the other 17
crowdfarms conceal the subcontracting process from requestors, believing that requestors should
only care about the outcome and informing them could result in a requestor questioning their
professional capabilities, with a negative impact on the possibility of future business. P13 and P14
illustrated the different opinions towards the transparency of task subcontracting:
“I generally do not let requestors know that I have subcontracted their tasks, even if only a
small part. This is because if the employer knows about this, it will affect his/her trust in
our company’s capabilities and thus affect the willingness to continue cooperating with
us.” (P13, 32 years old, male, design crowdfarm)
“We first negotiate with the requestors, and only subcontract the work units after getting
their permissions. This is because many customers are more concerned about a satisfactory
result. On the other hand, I personally think it is also a work ethic.” (P14, 28 years old,
male, IT crowdfarms)
4.4.2 Microtasks. Crowdfarms take on microtasks that they are capable of handling, but three
reported handing over a microtask when a new profitable macrotask came in. Twenty-six described
selecting microtasks to satisfy personal interests or hobbies, rather than for financial rewards.
Eleven noted that the time it would take to find an external contractor and checking their work was
much more costly than doing the task on their own, which was an activity they saw as beneficial.
As with macrotasks, microtasks generally commence with planning although not decomposition.
Six reported microtasks selected solely by management that were directly assigned to a crowdfarm
worker who was available and had the right experience. In most cases (37/53), microtasks were
procured with crowdfarm worker input and taken on voluntarily by workers. The more tasks they
take on, the more bonuses they can get. In the remaining 10 crowdfarms, crowdfarm workers
selected microtasks autonomously from the crowdsourcing platform and informed management
about the task duration and payment for the record. After a microtask is distributed to a specific
crowdfarm worker, s/he carries it out under management supervision. Due to the short task
duration (usually minutes to hours), and in contrast to macrotasks, there is no in-work report.
Instead, management generally examines the finished product with the crowdfarm worker when
the work is completed. If it is satisfactory, s/he submits the task to bid against other participants on
behalf of the company. However, if management is not satisfied with the work, they usually provide
feedback and ask for modifications before submission. Although the crowdfarms we interviewed
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generally do not update the work progress to microtask requestors as they do with macrotasks, eight
participants mentioned that requestors actively communicated with them when they liked their
submitted work but required a further change. In such situations, nearly half of our participants
(25/53) said that management assigns another employee with more skil or expertise to help refine
the finished product. This improves the overall quality and is a training opportunity for the initial
worker to learn from a more experienced colleague. Previous findings that around 10% of solo
crowdworkers capitalize on their social networks (e.g., friends, forums) to solve microtasks [20];
crowdfarm workers similarly gain support, provided by their employers in an organized and stable
manner. After passing the re-examination by management, workers submit to requestors. P15, a
manager from a design crowdfarm, shared his experience of working on microtasks:
“For smaller tasks, I generally do not require workers to report to me the progress, but still,
I have to check their work before handing it over to the requestors. If a worker, such as a
graduate, really cannot solve the problem independently, then I will find other old workers
to play the role of a mentor to help him.” (P15, 27 years old, male, design crowdfarm)
4.5

Reputation management

All crowdfarms in our study use diverse approaches to building and managing their reputation
when conducting macrotasks or microtasks. Service speed, quality, and attitude are considered, as
well as responses to comments from requestors. Although reputation management runs throughout
the task process, leading to task refinement based on requestor feedback, crowdfarms focus most on
it after a task is completed. Specifically, almost all crowdfarms (47/53) conduct post-task interviews
with requestors—through phone calls, social media, or ZBJ’s communication system)—to determine
satisfaction. In 20 of the crowdfarms, this is handled by dedicated employees good at customer
relations. As in earlier phases, if requestors are not completely satisfied, the crowdfarm usually
spends time refining the work until it is accepted with positive ratings and comments. Although
this extra work is not paid for, participants indicated that it is worthwhile. Companies typically
display requestor ratings on the company profile on the crowdsourcing platform. As with travel
accommodation and other product ratings, crowdfarms urge requestors to provide detailed comments on their service to make the evaluation appear authentic and credible to potential customers.
Ten participants reported that when requestors were dissatisfied with the final deliverables, the
company gave up part of the profit in exchange for positive ratings and comments. Although this
impacted revenue, the loss of future business due to negative reviews was considered more costly.
Reputation management is not restricted to ratings and comments. Sixteen participants reported
that they remained in regular contact with requestors after the completion of a job. Maintaining a
working relationship could lead to additional work through requestor referrals to third parties. Eight
other companies advertised on the crowdsourcing platform. Some invested to be included in the
company list displayed on ZBJ’s main page. Although costly, they reported that advertising gained
trust from requestors when bidding against crowdfarms or crowdworkers who did not broadcast
their names. Twenty-one other crowdfarms reported interest in investing in such advertisements
but had not yet done so due to financial constraints. P16 described how his media company improves
its reputation:
“We keep the contact information of the served requestors such as their Wechat. Sometimes
we will do a few small tasks for them for free and then ask them to help promote our
company in their Wechat Moment [similar to Facebook Timeline]. [...] We have also
considered advertising on ZBJ after we earn more money from our crowdwork. I heard
that advertisement is quite expensive.” (P16, 35 years old, female, media crowdfarm)
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5

DISCUSSION

Crowdfarms are companies with full-time employees, fixed workplaces and well-organized working
structures. Similar to typical small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in several ways, they are distinct
in representing a shifting focus from offline work to online crowdsourcing. Crowdfarms emerged
in China as crowdsourced tasks grew in complexity and Chinese crowdsourcing platforms and
government provided support. Our research indicates that these companies are accelerating the
process to expand business channels and customer sources, find suitable tasks, and generate
additional profit. Although crowdsourcing is a nascent and disruptive business model that deviates
in ways from traditional business operations [66], as it scales up it increasingly interacts with
the broader socio-technological environment, including government policy. Traditional business
entities can dynamically engage in crowdsourcing and benefit from the new digital paradigm.
Crowdfarming as a new type of workforce draws on the growth of crowdsourcing to provide an
alternative for companies to find crowdworkers with the right set of skills, avoiding a need to
decompose a complex task into smaller tasks and find solo crowdworkers with corresponding skills.
Many crowdsourcing platforms mainly support microtasking; crowdworkers in organizations with
clear roles and hierarchy can perform complex and open-ended tasks better. Crowdfarms pave the
way for the expansion of online macrotask completion. As a broader range of tasks are posted,
crowdsourcing platforms and the workforce involved in crowdwork benefit.
Crowdfarms focus on large, complex tasks that require tight collaboration of multiple workers
with different expertise. In addition to being profitable, macrotasks enable crowdfarms to fully
utilize the skills of their workers. Whereas traditional consulting companies do not typically take
on small crowdsourced tasks, crowdfarms do, not as a primary source of income but to fill gaps
between macrotasks, to motivate employees, and as training exercises for new employees who
will be taking on more complex crowdwork. A stable income stream and disciplined crowdfarm
workers support the operation of sustainable crowdfarms. Although most microtasks are taken by
solo crowdworkers, the participation of crowdfarms in microtasks might make this marketplace
more competitive, which could make it more difficult for solo crowdworkers to compete for suitable
crowdsourcing tasks that match their interests.
The process of procuring macrotasks through the ZBJ bidding process is significantly different
from that of microtasks in terms of required pre-task communication with requestors and compulsory contract-signing required by the platform. On a positive note, this workflow enables requestors
to select appropriate crowdfarms more effectively and protects the interests of both parties involved
in the deal. However, instead of public bidding on the task page, as is commonly practiced with
microtasks, contact between crowdfarms and requestors takes place through private phone calls,
which can cause competitors to question why they lost a bid. Low transparency of process can
negatively affect the concomitant trust, satisfaction, and motivation of crowdworkers [13, 17]. As a
corollary, greater transparency and clarity in notifying those who do not get the tasks would be good
for both platform and crowdworkers/crowdfarms, with detailed measures considered together with
the business rules (e.g., the protection of the business secrets). Because the selection of microtasks in
crowdfarms is often open to crowdfarm workers and not controlled by management, it improves the
work enthusiasm of the employees. This is signifcant because role-based organizational structures
in crowdsourcing can bring challenges related to incentivizing workers [38]. Our finding indicates
that traditional management approaches—in our case the autonomy of task selection—should be
considered in the effort to organize solo crowdworkers to function as a team. Autonomy in selection
and access to colleagues when necessary can lead crowdfarm workers to select challenging tasks
instead of the competent ones they are assigned when working on macrotasks. Crowdfarms tend
to select macrotasks in a safer manner than microtasks because (1) a failed microtask that leads
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to the loss of payment can be compensated for by the skill/expertise acquired by a worker; (2) a
failed macrotask results in more severe financial loss and reputation damage affecting the future
profitability of the company.
Crowdfarms carry out macrotasks and microtasks by internal collaboration of management and
employees. This process includes (1) task planning pertaining to both the management and crowdfarm workers; (2) task execution based on the supervision by managers; (3) task refinement based on
the feedback of managers and requestors; (4) task integration and inspection based on cooperation
between teams and colleagues; and (5) the final task submission. Microtasks eliminate the need
for some procedures, such as task decomposition and in-work report to managers. This confirms
experimental studies that found significant differences in workflows between microtasks and larger
and more complex tasks such as the formulation of work plans [46, 64]. Moreover, collaboration on
microtasks is limited to a manager, the worker, and, if necessary, help from experienced colleagues.
This suggests the possibility of a crowdfarm functioning as a set of ad hoc teams handling smaller
tasks. Although different from the Flash Teams in which the experts are hired online [45], such
specialized teams have been shown to be able to better solve microtasks requiring very high-level
performance. Another distinction between the collaboration of crowdfarms and collaboration
among solo crowdworkers is that the latter generally cooperate with others remotely [36], the
teamwork in crowdfarms is usually face-to-face in their shared workplaces, which according to
Battiston, Vidal and Kirchmaier [4] should improve the productivity of the workers, especially for
urgent or complex tasks.
Over half of the crowdfarms we interviewed subcontracted macrotasks when they were unable
to undertake certain work units or produce satisfactory results for requestors. In contrast, it is
rarely considered cost-effective to subcontract a microtask. It is not cost-effective or desirable to
shift interesting small work given that a crowdfarm will have the skills to complete it. Subcontract
behavior among crowdworkers is affected by their personal skillset, interests and the payment of the
tasks [42]. With macrotasks, we found that crowdfarms subcontract work to either local business
partners or on crowdsourcing platforms, and over time can develop a hybrid partner-crowdsource
approach: stable working groups composed of familiar crowdworkers. The collaboration between
crowdfarms and local companies is understandable given that crowdfarms often began as offline
businesses. Their practice of subcontracting to crowdworkers may affect the overall crowdsourcing
landscape, benefiting solo crowdworkers with more opportunities from macrotasks in which they
rarely participate, and enabling more connections among crowdfarms and solo crowdworkers in
related industries to form a cluster effect, benefiting everyone in the business field [2]. On the
other hand, subcontracting tasks has the potential of creating a secondary crowdsourcing market
in which crowdfarms partially control the price of tasks and subcontracted workers work directly
for subcontractors instead of requestors.
Subcontracting can raise issues of fair payment to secondary workers, the quality of subcontracted
tasks, the transparency of the subcontracting process, and work ethic, noted by Morris et al [42].
Many crowdfarms in our study have taken these issues into considerations by compensating
contractors reasonably well, providing a “thank you for trying” reward to submissions that are
unsatisfactory, and sometimes actively supervising the quality of the shifted tasks. However,
transparency and ethical challenges remain. Some crowdfarms do not inform requestors about
subcontracting. Some risk deskilling and dehumanizing solo subcontractors by decomposing tasks
inappropriately to an extreme level [42]. Consequently,we contend that crowdsourcing platforms
should develop appropriate strategies to regulate and normalize the secondary market formed
by task subcontracting by crowdfarms. For example. we found that some requestors care about
their task being processed by an unknown third party and others may not, so crowdsourcing
platforms could refine their task system by allowing a requestor to decide whether or not to permit
17

Yihong Wang, Konstantinos Papangelis, Michael Saker, Ioanna Lykourentzou, Vassilis-Javed Khan, Alan Chamberlain,
CHI’21, May 08–13, 2021, Yokohama, Japan
Yong Yue, and Jonathan Grudin

task subcontracting and by establishing a monitoring system to detect and report subcontracting
behaviors that violate a requestors’ norms.
Finally, our study shows that crowdfarms manage their image by reputation maintenance and
reputation expansion. They actively attempt to produce satisfactory work for requestors with posttask and compensatory strategies: (1) post-task communication with requestors for positive ratings
and comments; (2) extra work on final deliverables; and (3) discounting the final price in exchange
for positive feedback. To expand their reputation, we found that about half of the crowdfarms rely
on external resources, such as the requestor referrals and advertisements. These measures exceed
the strategies of typical solo crowdworkers who mostly rely on preventative tactics such as sticking
to familiar tasks and returning a task as soon as it is found to be difficult [21, 58]. Crowdfarms
also address requestor feedback during their longer macrotask engagements, enabling them to
safeguard their reputations in a remedial and more effective manner with less likelihood of a desk
rejection the way solo crowdworkers do, and of course in comparison to typical crowdworkers
working alone with limited incomes [5], crowdfarms have more resources to deploy to manage
their reputations, through advertising and employees dedicated to chasing after positive comments.
However, to the best of our knowledge, no crowdsourcing platforms have taken into account the
advantages crowdfarms have over solo crowdworkers in the design of their reputation system.
Given the importance of reputation in the selection of requestors on workers [62], we believe that
crowdsourcing platforms should (1) establish distinct rating systems for macro and microtasks to
avoid differences in reputation caused by the different types of tasks performed, and (2) provide
support for solo crowdworkers to “broadcast” their names and advertise their work.
Our research indicates that crowdfarms are affecting solo crowdworkers as well as crowdsource
requestors and platforms. For solo crowdworkers, crowdfarms are a double-edged sword. On the
one hand, profit-oriented crowdfarms rely on their advantages in teamwork and professionalism
to take on as many microtasks and macrotasks as possible, which leaves solo crowdworkers at a
disadvantage with the competition from specialized companies on an increasing array of tasks that
have been their primary source of income. On the other hand, by decomposing a procured macrotask
into smaller work units and subcontracting some of them, crowdfarms provide solo crowdworkers
whose primary focus is microtasks with opportunities to take part in more advanced macrotasks,
with the different skills and experiences obtained in this process helping develop their careers. For
requestors, crowdfarms provide an efficient and professional one-stop crowdsourcing platform
to find the expertise they require for a particular job. Requestors do not have to communicate
with multiple solo crowdworkers on different sub-tasks, they can simply select one crowdfarm
that decomposes and assigns tasks and later integrates the constituent parts for the requestor to
consider as a whole. A risk for requestors is that the subcontracting behavior of crowdfarm may
lead to unknown third parties performing aspects of tasks, increasing uncertainty about the quality
of the final submission. For platforms, crowdfarms provide the opportunity to expand macrotask
crowdsourcing and unleash the potential of their platforms to solve more complex problems that are
economic or social in nature. From an economic point of view, expanding platform functions will
attract more enterprises and individuals to post a wider variety of tasks, thereby increasing their
revenue as the intermediary between crowd workforce and requestors. Nonetheless, the emergence
of crowdfarms challenges the operation and management of platforms through the potential of a
secondary market where subcontracting crowdfarms take charge. As a result, although crowdfarms
are a small fraction of crowdwork today and it is too early to understand how this new workforce
will evolve, it is our contention that further research should be undertaken by both the scholarly
field and stakeholders involved in the crowdsourcing industry.
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CONCLUSION

Our study is the most detailed examination of crowdfarms to date. Although a relatively new
organizational player in Chinese crowdsourcing, there are already hundreds of thousands of
crowdfarms. They take on both macro and microtasks with methodical work practices and organized
procedures. A comprehensive view of crowdsourcing should include crowdfarm workforces that
approach tasks differently than the solo crowdworkers that have been the focus of most research. Our
study also indicates that platforms that want to support crowdfarm practices and their concomitant
impact on crowdsourcing should (1) increase the transparency of the bidding mechanism for
crowdfarms, (2) refine their task system by adding a function allowing a requestor to decide
whether to permit task subcontracting, (3) develop strategies to regulate and normalize the potential
secondary market formed by the task subcontracting of crowdfarms, and (4) establish distinct
rating systems for macro and microtasks, respectively.
A limitation of this study is the representativeness of the sample. The workers and managers we
interviewed worked for crowdfarms that primarily conduct their business on the largest crowdsourcing platform, ZBJ. Crowdfarms on other Chinese platforms, such as .EPWK, could have different
characteristics and work practices that warrant inspection. In addition, we relied on telephone
interviews and the oral self-report of participants. With this firmly in mind, future research on
the topic could involve (1) crowdworkers from other crowdsourcing platforms, and (2) additional
methodological approaches, such as a large survey or in-crowdfarm observation of workflows with
audio-video recording and note-taking. This could generate a more comprehensive understanding
of how crowdfarms operate in the crowdsourcing context, adding nuance to the chief findings of
this article.
With these caveats, we find that the study confirmed and extended prior research and presents a
coherent, logical picture of a rapidly evolving new organizational form. Will today’s relatively small
crowdfarms grow and focus entirely on online work? Will they adopt more practices of traditional
organizations? Will they be affected by the shift to more remote business interaction that some
anticipate as a result of COVID-19?
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